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THE UNITED STATES AND THE EY'PANSION OF THE
LAW BETWEEN NATIONS.'
Since the Great War began, in which, counting the Grand
Duchy of Luxembourg and the Republic of San Marino, fifteen
states are engaged at the time this article is written, and which
embraces in its area much more than half the land of the earth,
the rules and customs of the Law of Nations have been buffeted
about very much both upon the land and the sea. In this state
of tumult upon both land and sea, the United States of America, as the chief of the neutral nations, have again, as on several
previous occasions in the past, striven not only to perform with
impartiality their duties as a neutral state, but also to uphold
their rights according to the Law of Neutrality. For it must
not be lost sight of, as many people do, that under the Law of
Neutrality neutrals have rights which they can maintain, as well
as duties which they must perform. The stand taken by America in behalf of neutral rights during the present war, under
the leadership of President Wilson and Secretary Lansing, will
undoubtedly affect in some measure, impossible now of predic'It is to the Chancellor d'Aguesseau that is due the name, Droit entre

les gens.
'Albert J. Edmunds: The First Books Imported by America's First
Great Library, 1732, Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Philadelphia, 19o6, p. 3O.
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tion, the future development of public international law. It
would seem appropriate then, to point out briefly the influence
which the United States, since they declared their independence
one hundred and thirty-nine years ago, have exerted in shaping
and moulding, in some important particulars, the development
of the Law between Nations.
In colonial days a few copies of Grotius in Latin and likewise some copies of Puffendorf, most of them probably in Latin
too, found their way to the British North American colonies.
Thus the Library Company of Philadelphia, founded in 1731
by Franklin, ordered in March, 1732, an English translation of
Puffendorf's work, "Law of Nature, etc." 2

That library also

some years later obtained an English translation of the book
of the Swiss publicist, J. J. Burlemarqui, The Principles of Natural Law, published at London in 1758.3
When the struggle between the colonies and the mother
land had become an actuality, the need for "the latest word" as
to what was the Law between Nations, undoubtedly was felt
by the men who directed the policy of the united colonies. And
so to Charles Guillaume Frederic Dumas, belongs in large measure the honor, apparently, of sending over from Europe, where
modem international law was born in the early part of the seventeenth century, across the Atlantic Ocean to the newly forming thirteen American nations, the law binding between nations.
For Dumas sent from The Hague to Franklin at Philadelphia,
two copies4 of the new edition of the celebrated treatise of the
Swiss, Emer de Vattel, of Neuchatel, Le Droit des Gens ou
Principes de la Loi Naturelle.' This new edition was published
at The Hague in I775 and edited by Dumas. Vattel's work
was known at that time not only to every one in Europe who
3Concerning the colonization of the thirteen colonies and the influence
of European publicists on American thought, see Thomas Balch: Les Frangais
en Amrique Pendant la Guerre de l'Ind~pendance des Etats-Unis, 1777-1783,
Paris, 1872; Sydney George Fisher: The Struggle for American Independence, Philadelphia, i9o8; and Paul Fred~ricq of Ghent, an open letter in the
Journal de Gen~ve, July 1o, io9.
"Albert Henry Smyth: Benjamin Franklin, New York, i9o6, Vol. VI, p.
432.

'Vattel's work was first published in 1758.
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professed any knowledge of the Law of Nations, but also was
looked upon in the foreign offices of the European powers as the
leading treatise upon the subject. And even today Vattel's
treatise is continually cited by publicists in their writings, and
by lawyers before the courts in disputes turning upon the proper
application of the Law of Nations.
One of the two copies of Vattel which Dumas sent to
Franklin, the sage of Philadelphia presented in Dumas's
name to the Library Company of- Philadelphia which Franklin
had been instrumental in establishing in 1731. Among the
records of the directors of the library, there is this interesting
minute :-"Oct. 10, 1775. Monsieur Dumas having presented
the Library with a very late edition of Vattel's Law of Nature
and Nations (in French), the Board direct the secretary to return that Gentleman their thanks."
Franklin tells us that this copy was much used by the members of the First Continental Congress. This same copy undoubtedly was used by some of the members of the Second
Continental Congress, which sat at Philadelphia; by the leading
men who subsequently directed the policy of the united colonies
until the end of the war; and later by the men who sat in the
Constitutional Convention of 1787-89 and framed the Constitution of the United States. For in those days the library was
housed in Carpenter's Hall where the First Continental Congress deliberated and within a stone's throw almost of where the
Second Continental Congress met in the Colonial State House
of Pennsylvania, and likewise near where the men who framed
the Constitution held their discussions and where the Supreme
Court of the United States first held court. 6 That copy of
Vattel surely was well known to the early fathers of the Republic, some of whom read French with ease. And as it is expressly stated in the Constitution that the Law of Nations
forms part of the law of the land, thereby making international
law part of the law which American courts must take cognizance of and interpret when they give decisions, it is easily seen
"George Maurice Abbott: A Short History of the Library Company of
Philadelphia, Philadelphia, i913, p. II:
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that Vattel had a very appreciable influence in shaping the attitude of the United States of America towards the Law of Nations from their very beginning as a confederation of thirteen
newly constituted members of the family of nations until they
agreed by the adoption of the present Constitution to merge
themselves into the single and much greater single member of
the family of nations, the present United States of America.
Another copy of Vattel's work which Dumas sent to Franklin is in the library of Harvard University. Franklin sent it in
the summer of 1776 to James Bowdoin, afterwards Governor of
Massachusetts and a member of the Constitutional Convention
of 1787-89. Bowdoin presented it to Harvard College in
Franklin's name. But it should have been recorded as the gift
of Dumas, for it was at Dumas's wish that Franklin sent it to
Harvard College. In this Harvard copy there is written in a
French hand, apparently before it was pesented to Harvard University, the following commentary which is of remarkable interest for the then young North American Confederation. Probably it was written by Dumas with his own hand. But whether
it was original with him or was taken from the writings of one
of the sages who have in different climes and various epochs
commentated upon the manner and form of government of
mankind, it is not as yet possible to determine.
This French commentary begins with the caption, "A note
of the Editor" (sic), apparently in the same handwriting as the
note itself, which is as follows:
"II est des peuples g~n6reux et magananimes, que leurs vertu
rendra avec le temps des Etats absolument inddpendants & autonomes. 'Mes chers Amis (leur dira alors quelque Sage) Vous ne
sauriez mieux faire que d'adopter chez vous la Constitution Angloise, moyennant un petit changement qui, selon nwi, pourra rendre
plus parfaite cette forme de Gouvernement mtixte, si heureusement
tempirde. Ce changement est de n'avoir ni royautg, ni noblesse, ni
Sjnat hirdditaires. L'on peut tout aussi peu hdriter de l'art de
gouverner les hommes, que de celui de les gu6rir, ou de leur apprendre d penser, t! chanter, t danser. Gardez vous cependant de
rendre votre Gouvernement lectif; ce seroit encore pire: ce ne
seroient presque jamais les meilleurs ni les plus sages, mais les
plus forts 6 les plus mchants qui vous conduiroient.-Quinous
dtsignera donc les Peres de la Patrie?-Eh! rnes Amis, c'est la Na-
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ture, qui de tout temps les a inontrbs du doigt aux premieres Sociftbs; & les Socitbs suivantes ont toujours t aveugles, & sourdes
t la voix de la nature. Les plus dges d'entre vos Peres de familles*
fonciers, voila les seuls Rois, s'il en faut, les seuds SEnateurs,les seuls
Seigneurs (Seniores) dignes de Vous. Vous les tireres de la charrue; ils y laisseront leurs fits; & l'age avancj seul conciliera t ces
derniers le respect & la vbngration de vos petits-fils & de vos arrierepetits-fils, avec le droit s'ils se trouvent les ainis de toute la nation,
de la conduire t leur tour."'
A foot-note to the original manuscript text is as follows: "*Jappelle fonciers les prossesseursdes terres."
The above sage counsel as to the best manner of forming
the new government that was necessary to hold the colonies together, when read in the light of the history of the subsequent
one hundred and thirty-nine years which have elapsed since the
volume was presented to Harvard University, is certainly a
prophetic comment on the development of our political institutions. Thus in it, Lincoln, Grant and Cleveland loom up. And
also a suggestion of the decadence of the personnel of parliamentary government the world over as a result of manhood suffrage is made in it. Whether Dumas wrote the passage or
quoted it from some other publicist, the author of it, whoever he
was, was evidently a scholar -wellversed in the past experiences
of the human race in its efforts to solve the complex problem of
the art of government. Doubtless that commentary was read
not only by Franklin and Bowdoin, but also by some of the
other statesmen who helped to mould the institutions of the
United States.
As the Law of Nations was thus literally sent across the
Atlantic Ocean to the new budding thirteen nations by a Hollander residing at The Hague, in the treatise of a famous Swiss
publicist, a treatise which was recognized at that time all over
Europe as the leading authorative work upon the Law of Nations, as the Swiss Confederation up to that time had done more
by its foreign policy to develop the actual practice of neutrality
than any other power, and as Vattel had stated the conception
of neutrality, probably more clearly than any publicist up to the
time that he wrote, it was eminently fitting and logical that the
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young nation which resulted from the blending of the thirteen
colonies upon the adoption and ratification of the Constitution
of 1787-89, separated from Europe and its quarrels by the
broad Atlantic, should do much to develop and make more precise the Law of Neutrality. Indeed it is not risking much to say
that the policy of neutrality practiced by the United States and
demanded by them of other nations has been the most potent
single factor to shape the Law of Neutrality as we have it today.
During the middle ages it was considered perfectly proper
for one feudal potentate to allow another feudal prince to march
his troops across the territory of the former lord in order to
attack a third prince and his possessions, without the sovereign
whose lands were used as a highway for the purposes of the
attack being considered involved in the struggle in any way.
The belligerents were merely making use of the public highways. As the feudal holdings were slowly consolidated into the
European powers, more or less roughly in several instances upon
the basis of nationality, questions gradually grew out of the
political policy of the newly forming states, while at the same
time the questions that related to the conduct of individual lords
or nobles became of less and less importance. As the former
and newer class of questions gained in prominence with the
gradual change from the feudal system to the newer idea of
centralized monarchies as the basis of the political divisions of
Europe, the questions relating to the conduct of individuals became more and more insignificant and dropped gradually into
the background. But the idea of one potentate preserving what
is meant today by neutrality when others were engaged in war,
was practically not understood until Vattel's time; and even he
did not state it with all the fullness that the word neutrality
means today as a term of international law.
Grotius in his immortal work, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, published in 1625, said, according to Westlake's rendering, that
"the duty of those who keep aloof from a war is to do nothing by
which the one whose cause is bad may be strengthened, or the movements of him who is engaged in a just war may be impeded, but in
a doubtful case to treat the two parties equally in allowing passage,
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in furnishing supplies to their armies, and in abstaining from the
relief of besieged forces." 7
Thus in the absence of a benevolent neutrality which the father
of the Law of Nations urged at the end of the first quarter of
the seventeenth century, he taught equality of treatment for
both belligerents. And Bynkershoek in his Quaestiones Juris
Publici, published in i737, upheld Grotius in maintaining equality of treatment of the belligerents as the test of judging neutral
duties.8 Vattel, however, in the latter half of the eighteenth
century, maintained that the real test of neutrality was for a
neutral state to abstain from taking part in the war, except in
so far as it was bound by a former treaty to aid one of the belligerents.'
Thus the publicists progressed slowly on the road to the
present day well developed idea of neutrality. A decided impulse toward the acceptance of some of the rules that now
govern the relations of neutrals and belligerents on the sea was
begun under the leadership of the great Catharine and her
advisors, by an association of a number of the European nations in 178o, a league since known to history as the First
Armed Neutrality.
The most important impulse, however, to the expansion of
the Law of Neutrality was to come from the young Republic of
the west, in the last decade of the eighteenth and in the first
quarter of the nineteenth century.
The policy of neutrality set up and enforced by the United
States with Washington as President and Jefferson as Secretary of State, during the war waged .between France on the
one side and Great Britain and several other states on the other
side, shortly after the founding of the first republic in
France, defined much more clearly than had been the case in the
past, what might and might not be done on neutral territory in
behalf of belligerents.
'Liber 3, c. 17, § 3.

' Liber i, c. g. See also Du Ponceau's translation of the first book of
this work, published at Philadelphia in 18io under the title, "A Treatise of
the Law of War," Chapter 9.
'Liber 3, § 104.
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The French Republic declared war against Great Britain,
Holland and Spain, February ist, 1793. With the aim of
guarding the American Republic against needless embroilment
in the struggle, President Washington on April 22nd, issued his
now justly famous proclamation declaring the neutrality of the
United States of America and warning American citizens not
to give aid to either side in contravention of that proclamation
and the Law of Nations. 10 And that proclamation was illuminated by Jefferson in various state papers which he addressed
either to the ministers in America of the belligerent governments, or else sent through the intermediary of the American
representatives abroad to the belligerent governments.
In corresponding with the French minister to America,
Monsieur Gen&t, Jefferson had occasion to expound some points
of the Law of Neutrality which arose in the relations between
the two republics. For, upon landing April 8th, 1793, at
Charleston, South Carolina, two weeks before Washington issued his neutrality proclamation, the new envoy sent by the
French Government to the American Government at Philadelphia, Monsieur Gen~t, acting on the theory of neutrality that
had prevailed in the past when it was perfectly proper for a
belligerent to march troops across the territory of a neutral
state, to make war upon another belligerent, at once began to
arm and commission several vessels and then send them out to
sea to prey upon the maritime commerce of Great Britain, a
state with whom America was at peace. Minister Gen~t also
instructed the French consuls in America to act as courts of
admiralty to pass upon the legality of prizes brought by French
cruisers into American ports. Washington called his Cabinet
together, and it decided that the commissions granted to privateers by Gent, as also the condemnation of prizes by the consuls of France, were void. At another meeting of the Cabinet
it ordered that all privateers commissioned by Gen~t must leave
American ports, and took effective measures whereby other yes10American

p. 140.

State Papers, Foreign Relations, Washington, 1833, Vol. r,
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sels that were being fitted out as French privateers were prevented from going out to sea.
In answer to M. Genft's argument that it was a usual duty
of the consuls of France to grant commissions and letters of
marque to privateers, Secretary Jefferson wrote on June 5 th,
1793, to the envoy of France:
"It is the right of every nation to prohibit acts of sovereignty
from being exercised by any other within its limits, and the duty of
a neutral nation to prohibit such as Vould injure one of the warring
powers; that the granting military commissions, within the United
States, by any other authority than their own, is an infringement on
their sovereignty, and particularly so when granted to their own
citizens, to lead them to commit acts contrary to the duties they owe
their own country; that the departure of vessels, thus illegally
equipped, from the ports of the United States, will be but an
acknowledgment of respect, analogous to the breach of it, while it
is necessary on their part, as an evidence of their faithful neutrality."
Later, on August I6th, 1793, Jefferson wrote to the American Minister at Paris, Gouverneur Morris, further in support
of the right and duty of the United States to maintain its neutrality:
"The right of raising troops, being one of the rights of sovereignty, and consequently appertaining exclusively to the nation itself, no foreign power or person can levy men within its territory,
without its consent. . . . That if the United States have a right
to refuse the permission to arm vessels and raise men within their
ports and territories, they are bound by the laws of neutrality to
exercise that right, and to prohibit such armaments and enlistment."
It was soon found, however, by practical experience that
the United States of America could not, under the common law
as it then existed in America, effectively prevent their citizens
from taking an active part in the war and thereby endangering the neutrality of the country. Gideon Henfield, an American citizen, who had taken service on a French privateer, came
sailing up the Delaware in 1793 to Philadelphia, in charge as
prize master of a British vessel which had been captured by the
privateer. For thus disregarding the neutrality proclamation
of the President, he was indicted at common law, in the federal court. Although Justice Wilson in his charge to the jury,
urged upon them that the defendant should do nothing that
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might harm his country, that under the Constitution the treaties
of the United States with foreign powers were part of the law
of the land, and that the United States had entered into a treaty
of friendship with Great Britain which was then in force, the
jury, nevertheless, acquitted Henfield. 11
This verdict made it clear that the municipal law then in
force in the country might not be sufficient to prevent American citizens from engaging in their own country in the service
of a belligerent. President Washington and Secretary Jefferson persuaded Congress to pass the Neutrality Act of 1794.
That act temporarily forbade citizens of the United States from
accepting letters of marque from a belligerent state, or to enlist
in America in the military forces of a foreign nation, and prohibited vessels which were intended to cruise as privateers for
a foreign belligerent from fitting out and arming in American
ports. Several other acts relating to the same object of preserving the neutrality of the country were enacted from time to
time, until finally on April 2oth, 1818, under the influence of
the wars for independence of the South American countries
then in progress, Congress dealt with the subject on a comprehensive scale in the Foreign Enlistment Act which it enacted
and which is still in force. That enactment led in the following
year to the passage by the British Parliament of the British
Foreign Enlistment Act. And when as a result of the events
of the American Civil War, it became clear that the Act of 1819
was not sufficiently stringent to enforce British neutrality, it was
superseded by another act in 187o which is still in force. As
Westlake justly remarks, "no state law of the kind is a declaration to the world of what the state in question deems to be its
international duty as a neutral. It is a declaration to its own
subjects of the powers which it deems necessary to take- over
them, whether in pursuance of its own policy or in order to
ensure the performance of its neutral duty." Still the enactment of such municipal statutory law, is an indication of what
' Henry Wheaton: Elements of International Law, edited, with notes,
by Richard Henry Dana, Jr., Boston, I866, p. 543, note.
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the conduct of neutral nations towards belligerents should be.
The precautionary measures that many governments have since
taken by the enactment of municipal statutes to enable them to
safeguard and maintain their neutrality in case of need, have
resulted from the early lead that the United States of America
took in such matters.
The policy of neutrality as stated by Jefferson in his communications above quoted to Gen~t and Morris, and enforced
by the United States in the war then raging between France
and Great Britain, made much more clear than ever before that
time what can and cannot properly be done in neutral territory
in intercourse with belligerents. That policy has had a great influence on the expansion of the Law of Neutrality, and even
helped to gain the American legal victory before the Geneva
Tribunal in 1872.
If, however, under President Washington and Secretary
Jefferson, the American Republic took advanced ground to perform its neutral duties, it was not less backward, if perhaps not
so successful, in upholding the neutral rights of its citizens to
trade with countries with which, though they happened to be
belligerents, the United States were at peace and on terms of
friendship.
One of the most important of the state papers of Jefferson,
upholding the right of American citizens to trade with belligerents, was his letter of May x5th, 1793, to the British envoy at
Philadelphia, Mr. Hammond, in which the American statesman
defined the rights of American citizens to sell arms to any or all
belligerents. Jefferson said:
"Our citizens have been always free to make, vend and export
arms. It is the constant occupation and livelihood of some of them.
To suppress their callings, the only means perhaps of their subsistence, because a war exists in foreign and distant countries, in which
we have no concern, would scarcely be expected. It would be hard
in principle and impossible in practice. The Law of Nations, therefore, respecting the rights of those at peace, does not require from
them such an internal disarrangement in their occupations. It is
satisfied with the external penalty pronounced in the President's
proclamation, that of confiscation of such portion of these arms as
shall fall into the hands of any belligerent powers on their way to
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the ports of their enemies. To this penalty our citizens are warned
that they will be abandoned, and, that even private contraventions
may work no inequality between the parties at war, the benefit of
them will be left equally free and open to all."
That definition of the right of private citizens of a neutral
power to sell arms to any belligerent government, subject to
the risk of capture of the arms during their transit on the high
seas, by the cruisers of one of the belligerents, helped to form
international law on that point: and that statement is an absolutely sound exposition of the law of nations on that point today.
Other points of difference between the United States and
Great Britain, requiring a prooper interpretation of the rights of
neutrals, soon arose.
On June 8th, 1793, the British Government, by an Order
in Council, gave instructions to the commanders of British ships
of war and privateers having letters of marque against France,
to seize all neutral vessels laden with "corn, flour, or meal,
bound for any port in France, or any port occupied by the armies
of France," and all neutral vessels, except those of Denmark and
Sweden, attempting to enter any blockaded port.12 Since the
United States, Denmark, and Sweden were the leading neutral
powers, it was evident that this last measure was aimed against
American vessels. Though dated June 8th, this Order in Council was not issued until the 28th day of the month.13 The
British Minister at Philadelphia, Mr. Hammond, in communicating this Order in Council to Secretary Jefferson, said:
"By the law of nations, as laid down by the most modem
writers, it is expressly stated, that all provisions are to be considered
as contraband, and as such, liable to confiscation, in the case where
the depriving an enemy of these supplies, is one of the means intended to be employed for reducing him to reasonable terms of peace.
The actual situation of France is notoriously such, as to lead to the
employing this mode of distressing her by the joint operations of the
different powers engaged in the war. . . . The present measure
pursued by His Majesty's Government, so far from going to the extent which the Law of Nations, and the circumstances of the case
"American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Washington, 1833, Vol. i,
p. 240.
Ibid., p. 241.
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would have warranted, only has prevented the French from being
supplied with corn omitting all mention of other provisions; and
even with respect to corn, the regulation adopted is one which, instead of confiscating the cargoes, secures to the proprietors, supposing them neutral, a full indemnification for any loss they may
possibly sustain."
The American position on this question was stated at length
by Secretary Jefferson in a communication to the American
Minister at the Court of Saint James, Mr. Pickney. 1 4 After
speaking of having received unoffitial information of the Order
in Council of June 8th, and stating in substance the first article of

that Order, he went on to say:
"This article is so manifestly contrary to the Law of Nations,
that nothing more would seem necessary, than to observe that it is
so. Reason and usage have established, that when two nations go
to war, those who choose to live in peace retain their natural right
to pursue their agriculture, manufactures, and other ordinary vocations; to carry the produce of their industry, for exchange, to all
nations, belligerent or neutral, as usual; to go and come freely,
without injury or molestation; and, in short, that the war among
others shall be, for them, as if it did not exist. One restriction on
those mutual rights has been submitted to by nations at peace, that
is to say, that of not furnishing to either party implements merely
of war, for the annoyance of the other, nor any thing whatever to
a place blockaded by its enemy. What these implements of war are,
has been so often agreed, and is so well understood, as to leave little
question about them at this day. There does not exist, perhaps, a
nation in our common hemisphere which has not made a particular
enumeration of them, in some or all of their treaties, under the'
name of contraband. It suffices, for the present occasion, to say
that corn, flour, and meal are not of the class of contraband, and
consequently remain articles of free commerce. A culture which,
like that of the soil, gives employment to such a proportion of mankind, could never be suspended by the whole earth, or interrupted
for them, whenever any two nations should think proper to go to
war."

Jefferson went on to maintain that neither of the belligerents had the right to interrupt the legitimate trade of American
citizens with all the world. He made a powerful argument
that the United States had the right to trade in her food stuffs
with whom she wished, and asserted that if Great Britain felt
"4Ibid., p. 239.
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the need of reducing an enemy nation by starvation, she had no
right of doing it at the loss of the United States.
September 3, 1793, the British Admiralty issued an order
"that freight and reasonable expenses" should be allowed "to
all masters of neutral ships.

.

.

.

Provided always,

that no inala fides" should appear. The order went on to say,
"Demurrage shall be allowed, and considered as a reasonable
expense, only in cases where the ship shall be pronounced to have
been unjustly seized and brought in for adjudication," or when
the captured vessel was unfairly held.' 5
On the 6th of November, 1793, the British Government
applied the rule of the War of 1756 16 to the trade between
France and her colonies by an Order in Council that was published December 23d, following. It instructed the commanders
of British war vessels or privateers to capture and seize "all
ships laden with the produce of any colony belonging to France,"
or that carried provisions or supplies to any French colony.' 7
This order, of course, was equivalent to stopping all trade
by neutral nations with the colonies of France, and neutrals
It aroused
in this case meant practically the United States.'
much feeling among the American people towards Great
Britain.' 9
Meanwhile, Edmund Randolph, who had succeeded Jefferson as Secretary of State, had addressed on May ist, to the
British Minister at Philadelphia, Mr. Hammond, a long and
learned despatch protesting against the interference of Great
"Ibid., p. 315.

"Henry Wheaton (edited by Richard Henry Dana): Elements of International Law, Boston, 1866, p. 666; Theodore Dwight Woolsey: Introduction
to the Study of International Law, New York, 1883, Fifth Edition, p. 349.
John Westlake: International Law, Part II, War, Cambridge University Press,
1907, pp. 254-255; James Madison, Examination of the British Doctrine
Which Subjects to Capture a Neutral Trade Npt Open in Time of Peace,
18o6, see Letters and other Writings, Philadelphia, 1865, p. 229.
" American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Washington, 1833, p. 43o.
"James Madison: A Memoir Containing an Examination of the British
Doctrine Which Subjects to Capture a Neutral Trade Not Open in Time of
Peace, in "Letters and Other Writings," Philadelphia, 1865, Vol. II, p. 310.
"Richard Hildreth: History of the United States of America, New
York, 1882, Vol. IV, pp. 481, 482.
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Britain with the rights of the United States to carry on commerce with France except in contraband of war;20 and contraband of war in those days meant an infinitely more restricted list
of articles than it has been expanded into meaning today.
Many American vessels were taken and their cargoes condemned. This caused a hardship on the commerce of the
United States. Finally, however, the situation was eased off
in a measure by the British Government by an Order in Council
of January 8th, 1794, that revoked that of the previous 6th of
21
November.
This new Order changed, to quote James Madison, 22 "the
preceding instructions in three respects. First: in substituting
'the French West India Islands' for 'any colony of France,' of
which there are some not islands, and others not West India
Islands; Second: in limiting the seizure, to produce 'coming directly from any port of the said islands'; Third: in the very
important limitation of the seizure, to vessels bound from those
islands to any port in Europe."
These new regulations weighed less than the original Order
on the foreign commerce of the United States, especially in curtailing captures to vessels bound directly from the French West
India Islands to European Ports. The new Order, therefore,
allowed importation into the United States of French West
India production, which could then be retransported to Europe.2 3 And in spite of the need of paying customs duties to
America, a round about trade sprang up from the French West
Indies to Europe by way of the United States, which lasted for
more than ten years.
However the Americo-British relations continued strained.
In a message to the United States Senate, of April i6th, 1794,
President Washington spoke of the "serious aspect of our affairs with Great Britain," and then said:
"But as peace ought to be pursued with unremitted zeal, before
American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Washington, 1833, P.450.
'Ibid., p. 431.

'See supra, note I8,at p. 313.
' See supra, note 18, at p. 313.
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the last resource, which has so often been the scourge of nations,
and cannot fail to check the advanced prosperity of the United
States, is contemplated, I have thought proper to nominate, and dc;
hereby nominate, John Jay as envoy extraordinary of the United
States to His Britannic Majesty." 21
Mr. Jay's appointment was confirmed by the Senate.
Edmund Randolph, who had succeeded Thomas Jefferson
as Secretary of State, in his instructions to Jay of May 6th,
1794,25 referred to "the vexations and spoliations committed on
our commerce by the authority of instructions from the British
Government." Randolph further continued:
"You will perceive that one of the principles, upon which compensation is demanded for the injuries under the instructions of the
8th of June, 1793, is, that provisions, except in the instance of a
siege, blockade, or investment, are not to be ranked among contraband. . . . The matter of these instructions (November 6th,
1793) fills up the measure of depredations. They were unknown
publicly in England until the 26th of December, 1793; there is good
reason to suppose that they were communicated to the ships of war
before they were published, and that in consequence of a private
notification of them, a considerable number of new privateers were
fitted out. The term 'legal adjudication,' in spite of the explanation
on the 8th of January, 1794, was most probably intended to be construed away or not, according to events, and many vessels have been
condemned under them. Compensation for all the injuries sustained, and captures will be strenuously pressed by you."
Chief Justice Jay, as special American envoy, and Lord
Grenville, British Foreign Secretary, concluded on November
19th, 1794, a general convention adjusting the relations between
the two countries. That convention upon its ratification by the
United States Senate on June 24th, 1795, became a treaty. The
seventh article of that treaty provided for the settlement of the
claims of American citizens against the British Empire for
unjust seizure of their vessels and goods on the high seas by
British cruisers and privateers, during the war in progress between Great Britain and France, by a reference of such claims
to a board of five commissioners. The commissioners closed
" American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Washington, 1833, p. 447.
Henry Flanders: Lives and Times of the Chief Justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States, Philadelphia, iS8i, Vol. I, pp. 4o3-4o4.

' American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Washington, 1833, p. 472.
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many cases which they passed on, some they dismissed, and in
others they awarded damages.27 The total amount which they
awarded to American citizens was close to $1I,65o,ooo.oo.
The policy of the United States in carrying on war on
land has also profoundly moulded and shaped the rules governing the manner of conducting war on land. In the midst of the
American Civil War, upon the advice of General Halleck,
President Lincoln commissioned 'Francis Lieber of Columbia
College to draw up a code of rules for the instruction of the
armies of the United States in the field as to the manner of
carrying on war. Revised by American officers, these rules
were published by the American Government, April 14th, 1863,
under the title, Instructions for the Government of the Armies
of the United States in the Field, drafted by Francis Lieber.
While recognizing that the object of a belligerent engaged in
war on land is to win through the destruction or capture of the
army of the enemy and the resources upon which that army
relies, yet by that code 6f rules the federal authorities sought to
avoid needless destruction of life and property. This will be
seen by quoting a few of the rules, to wit:
"68. Modem wars are not internecine wars, in which the killing of the enemy is the object. The destruction of the enemy in
modem war and, indeed'modern war itself, are means to obtain that
object of the belligerent which lies beyond the war. Unnecessary or
revengeful destruction of life is not lawful.
"69. Outposts, sentinels or pickets are not to be fired upon except to drive them in, or when a positive order, special or general,
has been issued to that effect.
"7o. The use of poison in any manner, be it to poison wells or
food, or arms, is wholly excluded from modem warfare. He that
uses it puts himself out of the pale of the law and usages of war.
"71. Whoever intentionally inflicts additional wounds on an
enemy already wholly disabled, or kills such an enemy, or who
orders or encourages soldiers to do so, shall suffer death, if duly
convicted, whether he belongs to the army of the United States, or
is an enemy captured after having committed his misdeed."
"John Bassett Moore: Arbitrations to Which the United States Has
Been a Party, Washington, i898,Vol. I, p. 341.
21Ibid., pp. 343-344.
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This code of Lieber not only was used by the Union armie (
during the rest of the Civil War, but afterwards influenced the
framing of the code prepared, though never ratified by the
powers, at the Brussels conference of 1874. The war code of
Lieber, who was a great friend of Bluntschli of Heidelberg,
had an immense influence upon the preparation by the Heidelberg scholar of part of his proposed code of the Law of Nations.2 8

And Lieber's war rules and regulations formed the

basis of the rules of the law of war as determined at the First
and the Second Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907
respectively.
On the sea as well, the United States have led the way for
the codification of the rules of war. On June 27th, 19oo, the
United States published to the world a body of rules for the
use of their navy, the so-called United States Naval War Code.
These rules were drafted by Captain -(now Rear-Admiral)
Charles Herbert Stockton of the United States Navy. Though
this code of rules was withdrawn by the American Government
February 4th, 19o4, because until their adoption by the leading
maritime powers of the world, they would have placed the
United States Navy at a disadvantage in case the American Republic became engaged in war with a strong maritime power
which did not recognize the rules as binding upon its own naval
forces, nevertheless the work of Admiral Stockton marks the
beginning of a movement for the adoption by the nations in,
the future of some kind of international-naval war code.
While the United States of America did not originate the
movement aiming to free navigation upon many international
navigable rivers, that is, rivers flowing through or between the
territory of two or more nations through their entire navigable
course, to the navigation of the vessels and boats of all the riparian nations, still the United States by their policy in insisting
upon the freedom of navigation of the Mississippi as long as it
flowed through or along the territory of two nations, and likewise in obtaining by treaty in exchange for freedom of naviga* Le Droit International Codifi6, translated by Lardy, Paris, 187o.
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tion of the Yukon, the Stikine and the Porcupine rivers by British
vessels, the freedom of navigation of the St. Lawrence for
American vessels, the United States have helped the general
movement on the part of the family of nations to recognize,
that the vessels of the upper riparian nations of international
rivers and streams, shall not be cut off from access to the sea
by the riparian nations lower down or controlling the entrance
to the sea.
In working out the extent of the territorial sea, the
United States of America also have done their share. In contradistinction with the vast, and often empty, claims of various
sea powers to dominion over the sea that were put forward in
the middle ages, in the beginning of the seventeenth century the
idea was advanced-an idea which doubtless originated, as a
Scottish publicist, T. W. Fulton, has suggested, in the fertile
brain of Grotius and which another almost equally celebrated
Dutch publicist, Bynkershoek, made known to all Europe in the
next century-that along the sea shore where land and sea meet,
the power of the sovereign of the land over the adjoining sea,
extended as far as a cannon shot could be fired from the land out
over the sea. The idea of what was the equivalent in measured
distance of a cannon shot varied in different times and places,
until Thomas Jefferson, as American Secretary of State, stated
in 1793 both to M. GenEt, the envoy of France, and Mr. Hammond, the envoy of Great Britain, that the American Government
would consider it, for the purposes of regulating its neutrality
during the war then in progress between some of the powers of
Europe, to be the equivalent of three geographical miles. That
three-mile limit was adopted as the extent of the territorial sea
in the tieaty of I818 concluded by America and Great Britain,
and it has subsequently been adopted by most, though not by
all, of the members of the family of nations.
In the expansion of another field of the Law of Nations,
to wit, the development of the judicial machinery for substituting, whenever it is possible, judicial settlement for war in deciding the differences between nations, the United States have
-played a leading r6le; indeed it may be said that they have been
the leader.
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As the European nations began to emerge out of the gradually breaking up and disappearing feudal system, various plans
for substituting in some way international justice for international war in deciding the disputes between nations, began to be
made. Thus Henri Quatre and the Duc de Sully, Pmeric Cruc6,
William Penn, the Abb6 Castel de Saint Pierre, and Emmanuel
Kant, among others, advanced various schemes to do away,
more or less, with war. With some slight exceptions, however,
it was not until after the conclusion of the treaty of 1783 that
any continuous movement to avoid war by some means or other
of judicial settlement began to be put in practice. In the AngloAmerican treaty of November, 1794, known as Jay's Treaty,
provision was made to refer three then existing subjects of
disagreement between the contracting powers to mixed commissions for final decision and settlement.
Article five of Jay's Treaty provided for deciding what
river was meant by the "name of the river Saint Croix" in the
treaty of peace of 1783 between America and Britain; article
six arranged for the submission to arbitration of the claims of
British subjects against American citizens which had arisen in
the past owing to various causes; and article seven provided
for the settlement of the claims of American merchants which
had arisen against the British Government owing to the acts of
British war vessels. Eventually in the course of ten years or
so, all these questions were settled in the manner provided for
in Jay's Treaty. Then in concluding the war of 1812, again
America and England agreed by the Treaty of Ghent to submit
various boundary difficulties to international joint commissions.
And after that many times again until the advent of the Civil
War, the United States Government led in having its difficulties
with other governments submitted to some form of international
arbitration.
Then as the Civil War was approaching its close, it was
a member of the Philadelphia Bar, Thomas Balch, who proposed
in November, 1864, to President Lincoln and again ina public
letter printed in the New York Tribune, May I3th, 1865, that the
then pending American reclamations against Great Britain
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growing out of the Civil War, known under the generic name
of the Alabama claims, should be referred to a regularly constituted International Judicial Tribunal for judgment. That
proposal eventually ripened into the Geneva Tribunal of i87I29
72, which settled the Alabama claims by a judicial decision.
And the Geneva Tribunal became the model upon which were
constituted the Paris International Tribunal that sat in 1893
upon the Bering Sea fur seal fisheries case, the international
court which sat in judgment in the Venezuela boundary case,
and also profoundly influenced the work of both the First and
the Second Hague Peace Conferences in providing for a more
easy and flexible way of constituting international courts appointed ad hoc.
As a great deal of confusion has arisen since the meeting of
the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907 over the real
meaning of the words arbitration and arbitrator as terms of
the Law of Nations, it may not be amiss to define the judicial
meaning of the words, and differentiate them from the words
mediation and mediator, with which today, owing to poor scholarship, the former two are often confounded. Without referring to the older dictionaries of Philipp and Johnson in England,
and the edition of 1694 of the dictionary issued by the French
Academy, it may be worth while to quote from one or two editions of the dictionaries of Webster and Worcester.
Noah Webster, in his Dictionary published at New Haven
in i8o6, gives these definitions: "Arbitrate, v. to hear and judge
as an arbitrator." "Arbitration, n. reference of a controversy
to persons chosen by the parties, a hearing before arbitrators."
"Arbitrator, n. a person chosen by a party to decide a controversy, one who has the sovereign right to judge and control."
Webster in his day and since has been recognized among scholars for having had a great knowledge of the meaning of words.
And in the above quotations, from the first edition of his celebrated dictionary, he distinctly maintains that to arbitrateis to
' Concerning the Alabama Claims, see Frank Warren Hackett: Reminiscences of the Geneva Tribunal of Arbitration, 1872, New York and Boston, 1911.
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judge, and that an arbitratoris one who possesses the "sovereign right to judge." Webster does not anywhere in the above
citations even remotely suggest that arbitration means conciliation or mediation. In the revised and much enlarged edition of
Webster's work, published at Springfield in 19o8, it is distinctly
affirmed again that to arbitratemeans: "i. To decide; to determine. 2. To act as arbitrator or judge." Further in the edition of 19o8 mediate and cognate words are defined as follows:
"Mediate, a. i. Being between the two extremes; middle; interposed; intervening; intermediate." "Mediate, v. i. i. To be in
the middle, or between two; to intervene. 2. To interpose between parties, as the equal friend of each, especially for the
purpose of effecting a reconciliation or agreement, as, to mediate
between nations." "Mediator, n. One who mediates;, especially, one who interposes between parties at variance for the
purpose of reconciling them; hence, an intercessor."
Joseph E. Worcester, who also is held in high esteem in the
world of scholars for his sound and extensive knowledge of
the meaning of English words, likewise maintains, in his dictionary published at Boston in 1846, that an arbitratoris a judge,
not a reconcilor. He says: "Arbiter, n. (L) One appointed
to decide a point in dispute, an arbitrator, a judge." "Arbiter,
v. a. To judge." Arbitrate, v. a. To decide; to judge of."
"Arbitrate, v. n. To give judgment. South." "Arbitration,
n. Act of arbitrating (Law), the investigation and determination of a cause by an unofficial person, or by persons mutually
chosen by the contending parties; arbitrament." "Arbitration,
Bond, n. (Law) A solemn obligation to submit to an award.
Blackstone." "Arbitrator, n. An umpire, a judge (Law). A
person chosen by parties at variance to determine a matter in
dispute." Thus after distinctly stating in the above quotations
that an arbitrator is a judge, Worcester goes on to define mediation as "the act of mediating; interposition, intervention,
agency interposed; intercession," and a mediator as, "One who
mediates; an intercessor; one of the characters of our Blessed
Savior." According to Worcester, therefore, there is nothing
in common between arbitration and mediation. On the contrary
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according to him they are words having different and distinct
meanings, the former referring to a judicial function, the latter
to a diplomatic one.
So likewise, by turning to the masters of the science of the
Law of Nations, it becomes evident that by arbitration they
mean a judicial process, while by mediation they denote a diplomatic mode of settling questions of dispute that arise between
nations.
Vattel says: 30

"The mediator ought to observe an exact impartiality; he
should soften reproaches, calm resentment, and draw minds toward
each other. His duty is to favor what is right, and to cause to be
restored what belongs to each; but he ought not scrupulously to insist on rigorous justice. He is a moderator, and not a judge; his
business is to procure peace; and to bring him who has right on his
side, if it be necessary, to relax something with a view to so great
a blessing.

.

.

.

When sovereigns cannot agree about their pre-

tensions, and yet desire to maintain, or to restore peace, they sometimes trust the decision of their disputes to arbitrators chosen by
common agreement. As soon as the compromise (agreement) is
concluded, the parties ought to submit to the sentence of the arbitrators; they have engaged to do this, and the faith of treaties
should be regarded."
Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns says: 31
"There is an international law. This law grows either from
conventions, or from general principles accepted by civilized nations. . . . The states which accept arbitration recognize by
that very thing (and it is that which gives to that procedure so great
a value) that their difference is susceptible of being settled by the
rules of international law, either general or conventional. It is to
falsify that idea and to compromise its application, to admit beforehand in the agreement (compromis) itself, the eventuality of a solution dictated, not by the law, but by an arbitrary appreciation of
the convenience of each party."
Westlake in contrasting arbitration with mediation, says: 32
"The essential point is that the arbitrators are required to decide the difference-that is, to pronounce sentence on the question of
Emer de Vattel: The Law of Nations, or Principles of the Law of

Nature, Dublin, 1787, pp. 415-416.
'1Revue de Droit International et de LUgislation Compar~e, Brussels,

1891, pp. 84-85.

John Westlake: International Law, 2nd ed., part I, p. 354.

136

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

right. To propose a compromise, or to recommend what they think
best to be done, in the sense in which best is distinguished from
most just, is not within their province, but is the province of a
mediator."
It has been said by Mr. John Bassett Moore a propos of
mediation: 33
"It is important from the practical as well as from the theoretical side of the matter, to keep in view the distinction between
arbitration and mediation-a distinction either not understood or
else lost sight of by many of those who have undertaken to discuss
the one subject or the other. Mediation is an advisory, arbitration
a judicial function. Mediation recommends, arbitration decides.
And while it doubtless may be true that nations have, for this
reason, on various occasions accepted mediation when they were unwilling or reluctant to arbitrate, it is also true that they have settled
by arbitration questions which mediation could not have adjusted.
It is, for example, hardly conceivable that the question of the Alabama claims could have been settled by mediation. The same thing
may be said of many boundary disputes. In numerous cases the efforts of mediators have been directed, and successfully directed, to
bring about an arbitration as the only means of putting an end to
the controversy."
He says t propos of arbitration:
"Its object is to displace war between nations as a means of obtaining national redress, by the judgments of international judicial
tribunals; just as private war between individuals, as a means of
obtaining personal redress has, in consequence of the development
of law and order in civilized states, been supplanted by the
processes of municipal courts."
In this connection it must not be forgotten that the
United States of America have materially aided the development
of mediation as a mode of adjusting international disputes.
Thus for example, the calling in by President Wilson of the
A. B. C. Powers of South America for the Niagara Falls Mediation Conference in 1914, to mediate between the United States
and the various factions of Mexico, as well as between those
factions themselves, was a notable precedent for the use of mediation between nations. While it is true that the efforts of Ar' John Bassett Moore: History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to Which the United States Has Been a Party, Washington, 1898,
Vol. V, p. 5042.
Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 25.
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gentina, Brazil and Chili acting at that conference through their
ambassadors accredited to Washington were only in part successful, nevertheless, they did succeed in avoiding war between
the United States and Mexico. In addition, in acting on that
occasion as compositeurs amiables between the two North American nations, the A. B. C. Powers, thanks to the initiative of
President Wilson in calling on them for their good offices,
helped on the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine into the PanAmerican Doctrine.
If the United States of America have only aided, however,
where other nations had previously led the way, in the use of
mediation, a diplomatic function, as a means of avoiding war,
the North American republic has distinctly taken the leadership
so far among the nations of the world in developing the substitution of international justice for international war in settling
the disputes arising between nations. The Great War now
raging-the greatest war that has been waged since human history began, in which most of the powers of Europe are engaged busily in destroying millions of lives and countless
amounts of wealth saved and accumulated by past generations
through many centuries-shows conclusively that there are some
disputes arising between nations which cannot be settled before an international tribunal.35 For if the contestants had
really desired to avoid war in the present instance by an appeal
to judicial means, it was not difficult for them to have called into
being one of The Hague International Courts created ad hoc for
which provision was made at the First Hague Peace Conference
of 1899.
Serbia signified her willingness to appear with AustriaHungary before such a court, 30 but the fact that such a tribunal
was not called into being to pass judgment upon the original
difficulty between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, thereby embroil' Thomas Balch: International Courts of Arbitration, 1874, 6th ed., Philadelphia, 1915, passirn.
mSi Vianna: Qui a Provoqu6 la Conflagration Europ~enne? Rio de
Janeiro, i915, p. i6. Ellery C. Stowell: The Diplomacy of the War of 1914,
The Beginnings of the War: Boston, i915, p. 64.
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ing almost all Europe in war, shows that the cause of dispute in
this case was of a very different character from the cause of
difference in the Alabama claims and Bering Sea fur seal
cases.37 In the latter two cases which were both submitted and
argued at the bar of and decided, according to the Law of
Nations and the evidence submitted, by international tribunals
appointed ad hoc, the political prestige and development of the
litigant nations were not at stake. For, in favor of whichever
nation, in those two cases, the court might decide, the judgment
would not hamper nor menace the future political power of the
loser. As a matter of fact the United States of America won
the first case; Great Britain the second. And neither power for
a day interrupted, because of either of those decisions, the even
tenor of their political development.
But in the intermixed rivalry of the various powers of
Europe, which finally broke out into war last year between
Austria-Hungary and Serbia in the first instance, the political
force and future development of the great powers were so interwoven that it was useless to hope that such a contest could be
permanently settled by an international tribunal, whether such
a court were constituted ad hoc according to the provision made
by the First and Second Hague Peace Conferences, or whether
there had existed a Supreme Court of the Nations always in
being and composed of a small number of judges appointed for
life, a dozen or fifteen in number. For no judicial tribunal
could have decided which group of powers in Europe was the
stronger and entitled to the hegemony in the affairs of Europe
and the old world generally, which meant the power to control
a large part of the commerce of the world to its own advantage.
The same thing was true in 1870-7I on a smaller scale in the*
contest, between France and Germany, for the Franco-Prussian
war likewise was a contest to determine which was the stronger,
in shaping the policies of the European powers, France or Germany. In both the Alabama claims and the Bering Sea fur
'Thomas Willing Balch: Diffirends Juridiques et Politiques dans les
Rapports des Nations, Revue G~nrale de Droit International Public, Paris,
I914, PP. 137-182.
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seal cases, however, it was not a question of which was the
stronger, the American Republic or the British Empire, but
which was right according to the Law of Nations in its contention over a question in dispute which did not affect the vital
political development of either nation in the future.
The classes of differences arising between nations which
seem to be susceptible of a judicial solution have been termed
by the French publicists cas juridiques, while those that do not
seem to fall within the pale of international judicial procedure
they have called cas politiques. The notable British publicists,
Westlake and Oppenheim, have designated these two types of
cases respectively, legal and political cases. Of late it has been
the fashion amorig pacifists to call these two classes into which
international cases seem naturally to divide, justiciable and nonjusticiable cases. Certainly the term non-justiciable, which is
a negative expression, is inferior to the term political, which
is a positive expression, to designate the cases that apparently
are not susceptible of being settled by reference to an international tribunal.
The past development and actual use of resorting to international justice to settle many difficulties that have threatened
the amicable relations and peace of nations, prove beyond the
shadow of a doubt that recourse by nations to international
tribunals such as the courts that sat at Geneva on the Alabama
claims and at Paris on the Bering Sea fur seal fisheries cases,
has been a most precious mode of avoiding war. But in view of
the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71, the South African war
of 1899-1902, the Russo-Japanese war of 1903-1905, and the

Great War now raging, it is evident that in the present social
and political development of the world, it is absurd to think that
all causes of rivalry developing between nations can finally be
decided by a reference to an international court instead of by
war. And it will be a long time, if ever, before war is eliminated from human affairs.
Nevertheless, the United States of America may justly
glory in the part they have taken in developing the recourse
among nations of referring their differences often to interna-
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tional judicial tribunals, and in the great suffering and loss that
has thereby on several occasions been spared to humanity.
From this hasty look at the part this country has taken in
shaping the Law between Nations, it becomes clear that the
United States of America have played a notable r6le. Through
their foreign policy from President Washington and Secretary
Jefferson to President Wilson and Secretary Lansing, and by
the writings of the American international publicists-Noah
Webster, Peter Stephen Du Ponceau, James Kent, Henry
Wheaton, Francis Lieber, William Beach Lawrence, Richard
Henry Dana, Jr., Theodore Dwight Woolsey, Thomas Balch,
Francis Wharton, Freeman Snow, to mention only some-they
have done much to orientate the Law between Nations to the
advantage of humanity and the advancement of the civilization
of the world.
Thomas Willing Balch.
Philadelphia.

